On Whether “Damages” and “Compensation” Amount to Same Thing in Context of Section 11(5) and (6) Oil Pipelines Act:

In the context of section 11(5) and (6) of the Oil Pipelines Act, the words “damages” and “compensation” carry identical connotations and can be used interchangeably. In the instant case, the appellant contended that by section 11(5) and (6) of the Oil Pipelines Act, the respondents could only seek compensation and not damages which they sought in their writ of summons and statement of claim. The use of “damages” in the respondents’ claim did not in any way affect the validity or competence of their claim. Hence, the respondents complied with the provisions of the Act and their claim was rightly entertained by the trial court. The argument of the appellant was rather pedestrian.

On Meaning and Application of Doctrine of Exhaustion of Local Remedies:

The doctrine of exhaustion of local remedies postulates that a party must exhaust all internal remedies donated to him by a statute, before approaching a court for redress. Where a party ignores them, his action would be declared premature and incapable of activating the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the action. The philosophical basis for the doctrine is, inter alia, to prune down the quantum of disputes that inundate the court for judicial determination. In essence, the doctrine is similar to an alternative dispute resolution mechanism which litigants are enjoined to embrace.

On Onus of Proof of Malicious Act of Third Party:

The defence of malicious act of a third party is provided in section 11 of the Oil Pipelines Act. B y virtue of sections 133(2), 136(1) and 140 of the Evidence Act 2011, the evidential burden of proof, vis-a-vis the malicious act of a third party, rests squarely on the shoulder of the person alleging the act; in this case, the appellant. This is because the appellant was the one who wished the court to believe in the existence of a particular fact, malicious act of a third party, which fact was within its knowledge.

On Onus and Standard of Proof of Malicious Act of Third Party:

The defence of malicious act of a third party, which translates to illegal oil bunkering, as typified and exemplified in DW2’s evidence-in-chief in the instant case, is a criminal act which the law demands must be proved beyond reasonable doubt by virtue of section 135(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011. In the instant case, the appellant claimed it reported the incident to the police, yet no police report of investigation pinned the cause of the spillage to a third party. The report was a causa sine qua non for proof of the hostile act of a third party. There was a drought of evidence to demonstrate that the leakage was occasioned by the malicious act of a third party to absolve the appellant from a liability. Thus, the onus probandi, which the law thrusts on the appellant alleging the defence of malicious act of a third party was not discharged, and therefore the defence remained unproved.

On Effect of Successful Proof of Malicious/Hostile Act of Third Party in Oil Spillage:

A party who pleads malicious/hostile act of a third party and proves it, is exculpated from any liability associated with injurious affection of oil leakage/breakage.

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The Meaning of Damages:

Damages have been defined as the pecuniary compensation which the law awards to a person for the injury he has sustained by reason of the act of default of another, whether that act or default is a breach of contract or tort.

The Meaning of Compensation and Whether it Amounts to Damages:

Compensation connotes payment of damages, or any other act that a court orders to be done by a person who has caused injury to another. Compensation and damages amount to the same thing in their significance. They are synonymous and co-extensive, and are not mutually exclusive. Thus, it is not an affront to the law to deploy the two terms interchangeably in the temple of justice. Section 11 of the Oil Pipelines Act employs the two words interchangeably. In the instant case, the respondents’ claim of damages, in lieu of compensation, was not contrary to the provision of section 11 of the Oil Pipelines Act as to defeat their case. The claim in damages was cognizable in law.

The Meaning of Special Damages:

Special or particular damages are those damages which are the actual, but not necessary, result of the injury complained of but follow it as a natural and proximate consequence in a particular case; that is, by reason of special circumstances or conditions. In the instant case, the respondents’ claim was rooted in special damages.

The Need for Special Damages to be Specially Pleaded and Strictly Proved:

Special damages must be specifically pleaded with particulars and strictly proved. By strict proof, the law means that a party claiming special damages should establish his entitlement to them by credible evidence of such a nature and character that would suggest he is entitled to them.

The Need for Special Damages to be Strictly Proved:

An admission by an opponent party of special damages does not relieve a claimant from strict proof thereof.

On When Court Will Award Both Special and General Damages:

Where a party is able to show, or where it is glaring from the surrounding circumstances of the case and the nature of the injury suffered by the party that special damages would not adequately compensate for all the loss, the court must go ahead to award both special and general damages and this cannot be termed double compensation. Within the concept of where there is a wrong, the court must provide a remedy. In the determination of disputes and in the consideration of the matter before the court, where the claimant occasioned incidental loss, injuries, costs and other consequences resulting from the misconduct of the defendant, the court is obliged to make an assessment in general damages with the standard of the reasonable man. By the pleadings and evidence in the instant case, both special and general damages were proved with preponderance of evidence.

What Amounts to Family Land:

By definition, family land is land which vests in a group of persons and their children. It could also refer to land which had vested upon individuals who have descended from a common ancestry or pedigree, and including those such as domestics and strangers who have been incorporated into the family by the founder. At the death of the founder, all the empty land, farm land and houses acquired by him in his lifetime become family property. In plain language, the land belongs to the family of the said founder as a corporate entity in which case they become inalienable or they become distributable to the members of the founder’s family as defined by him during his lifetime. Hence, a family land belongs to a “vast family of which many are dead, few are living and countless members unborn”.

The Connotation of Family and Right Thereof to Own Land as Such:

In the realm of etymology, a family connotes:

(a)     a group of persons connected by blood, by affinity, or by law, especially within two or three generations;

(b)     a group consisting of parents and children;

(c)     group of people who live together and usually have a shared commitment to a domestic relationship.

A family is thus a conglomeration of individual citizens, and the law does not discriminate against a family of the right to own/hold land.

Who can Sue to Protect Family Property:

A family member is clothed with an unbridled licence to sue and protect a family land/property against any wrongful interference therewith, with or without the consent of other members of the family. In the instant case, the respondents exercised their legitimate right by approaching the court to ventilate their nursed grievances over the injuries suffered from the spill in the appellant’s oil pipeline. In that regard, the respondents disclosed categorically in paragraph 1 of the statement of claim that they “are bringing this action for themselves and as representatives of Okeh family members affected by the Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Limited Oil Spillage at Eneka.” That averment clearly answered and doused the appellant’s query on the absence of members attached to Okeh Family. It was of no moment that the word “members” was a prefix or suffix to Okeh Family. The bottom-line is its existence. It was part of the agitation of the appellant that there was no common interest and grievance between the representatives and the represented. The evidence on record demonstrated that the respondents’ occupation was farming and they did their farming and other economic activities in and around their large tract of land which was polluted by the oil spillage flowing from the pipeline of the appellant. There was an existential commonality of interest and grievance between the respondents on record, the representatives, and the Okeh Family members, the represented, which sustained a representative action.